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In May’s presidential elections, France faces a choice between the incumbent centre
right candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, and the socialist, François Hollande. As the race
narrows, Maurice Fraser looks at both candidates and the likely impacts their
election might have on France’s domestic, EU and foreign policies. Whoever wins the
election and becomes president, France is certain to retain its very sbripecific brand
of exceptionalism.
If the socialist candidate, François Hollande, is elected president in May, it’s likely that,
in June, French voters will give him a working majority in the National Assembly. France would then join
the small handful of EU member states with a left-wing administration. But, as the polls narrow, it’s now
clear that that scenario is by no means a foregone conclusion:  Nicolas Sarkozy acquitted himself well
in the aftermath of the horrific events inToulouse.  His muscular stance on immigration and security –
calling Schengen into question, promising to halve legal immigration, and deporting radical Islamists –
is helping to shore up support on his right flank. And, of course, he is a formidable campaigner.
Conventional wisdom is that, after the election, the socialists (now under pressure on their left flank
from Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s Front de Gauche) will return from their rhetorical comfort zone of
capitalism-bashing and follow a more pragmatic course. François Hollande, studiously cultivating the
presidential sobriety which eluded Nicolas Sarkozy earlier in his administration, seems an unlikely
sans-culotte. But that said, from a liberal or Anglo-Saxon perspective the mindset of the Left still looks
curiously old-fashioned, and will do little to move the terms of France’s national debate in a way which
will facilitate the structural reforms which the country badly needs.
The French socialist party, unlike its sister parties in Europe, remains at heart just that: a socialist party.
It has not gone through the process of policy modernisation which social democratic parties have
undertaken elsewhere in Europe: even if it has grudgingly made its peace with fiscal restraint and has
had to accept the orthodox monetarism of the ECB, it remains deeply hostile to supply side reform and
liberalisation. And, as The Economist recently pointed out, French socialists worry far more about
redistribution than wealth creation.
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Hollande’s programme, including a 75 % top rate of income
tax, higher taxes on wealth, dividends and companies, an
increase in the minimum wage and, bizarrely, the plan partly to
reverse Sarkozy’s increase in the retirement age, has raised
serious concerns about French competitiveness amongst the
country’s employers. His pledge, if elected, to renegotiate the
fiscal compact of the EU25 is studiously vague (the
assumption in Brussels being that he is looking for a bit more
wording on growth ). But on most aspects of Sarkozy’s
reforms, the socialist candidate is playing his cards close to
his chest, while his campaign director, Pierre Moscovici,
insists that the socialists are not in the business of wholesale
repeal. Sarkozy’s measures which would stay include France’s
membership of NATO’s integrated military command, following
its return in 2008 after a 42-year absence at the hands of
President de Gaulle, though Hollande still talks of achieving a
more ‘balanced’ relationship with the Americans.
But to measure the extent to which a socialist victory would
mark a return to a more ‘traditional‘ French model of dirigisme and protectionism, we need to consider
Sarkozy’s record as the proponent of ‘ rupture ‘ with France’s Jacobin past. Here the balance sheet is,
at best, mixed. To be sure, he has discarded the radical liberalisation with which he persuaded a
majority of French voters in 2007 to put head before heart and choose change, a pitch which earned
him the nickname of ‘Sarkozy the American’.  Some of the rhetoric during the second half of Sarkozy’s
presidency  - on markets and globalisation, EU competition policy, the call for a‘ Buy European Act’ to
counter ‘unfairness’ in global public procurement , and the idea of an EU-wide financial transactions tax
– reverts to French type in its hostility to markets and their workings.
In spite of these measures, structural unemployment and youth unemployment remain stubbornly high.
Public spending accounts for a stratospheric 56% of GDP – higher thanSweden’s – and its level of
public debt, already 90%, is still rising.  In mitigation it could be argued that any French leader would
have been hard pushed singlehandedly to overturn a public mindset with three centuries of statist
ancestry. But that is of scant comfort to bond markets still unconvinced about France’s budgetary
sustainability.
At the EU level, ambitious French ideas for EU economic governance, such as harmonisation of
company taxes and labour market rules, are making little headway, their negotiability with many   fiscal
compact members looking highly improbable. In factParishas now gone quiet on the subject, preferring
instead to focus on closer economic convergence withGermanywhere possible.
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But from a liberal perspective, Sarkozy’s presidency can count some
useful improvements, including the flexibility introduced into the 35
hour week, measures to cut back the bloated public sector payroll
(mainly through natural wastage), fiscal incentives for SMEs to take
on workers, and desperately needed autonomy for universities. But
there is still much unfinished business, not least the long-term
sustainability of France’s national insurance fund. And Sarkozy
seems to grasp the seriousness of the challenge posed by France’s
declining competitiveness.
No one should be surprised at Sarkozy’s caution: he is, after all, a
French president, and one who would like to be re-elected. And we
should remember that, in the popular imagination, France’s post-War
narrative of economic success has been built on an active state, just
as Britain’s narrative of economic recovery after years of post-War
decline has been built on deregulation and privatisation.  Yet, for all
the reservations, the view inLondonremains that Sarkozy, almost
uniquely amongst contemporary French politicians, just about ‘gets
it’.
On European and foreign policy, Sarkozy has set the bar high in
terms of pro-activism – something which even many of his detractors
acknowledge. Of course the constitution of theFifthRepublicwill
always propel a French president  onto the world stage, and it may be that the low-key Hollande would
maintain France’s high international profile. But Sarkozy’s commitment to NATO and his intensification
of the defence partnership with Britain, not only in the Libyan theatre but in terms of the ambitious
collaboration mapped for the next few years, have given encouragement not only to Anglo-Saxons and
atlanticists but also to those ‘realist ‘ pro-Europeans  who know that French and British leadership are
essential if the EU’s fledgling common Security and Defence Policy is ever to turn into something
substantial.
For his part, Hollande will stand by the Franco-British defence treaty, but he would almost certainly try to
place it in a more ‘European ‘framework, which could be problematic for relations with Britain. More
generally, the expectation is that his EU policy would have a less intergovernmental, more federal
complexion than that of Sarkozy. Here too there is the potential for disagreement between London and
Paris, to say nothing of the risk of friction later this year in EU budget talks over Britain’s rebate and
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, whoever becomes French president.  But the self-denying
ordinance which Sarkozy and Cameron have observed on the subject so far, and more generally the
unprecedentedly close and effective relationship which the two countries have forged, give some
grounds for optimism.
Whoever becomes president, France will retain its very specific brand of exceptionalism, where,
confusingly, political rhetoric is both to the left and right of political practice. Ostensibly an artful way of
of conducting politics and attracting diverse political constituencies, it makes it difficult to mobilise
public opinion around a coherent agenda – not least one of structural reform. It’s not a quandary which
will be resolved this side of the presidential elections.
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